by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)
Lenders are often faced with a dilemma when dealing with property that is in foreclosure and has been abandoned by the borrower. A lender must, under New Jersey law, maintain the property "to such standard or specification as may be required by state law or municipal ordinance." Also, the lender has an obvious interest in protecting the value of its collateral. But the lender does not want to take "possession" of the property and be deemed a "mortgagee in possession," because that would impose upon the lender the duty of a "provident owner," which includes the duty to manage and preserve the property, and which subjects the lender to liability for damages to the property and damages arising out of torts that occur on the property. Unfortunately, the point at which a lender takes "possession" of property is not entirely clear. I have written about this before, and the Appellate Division's recent opinion in Woodlands Community Association, Inc. v. Mitchell provides some additional guidance, which should be helpful to lenders.
In Woodlands, defendant was the assignee of a note and mortgage related to a unit in plaintiff's condominium development. The unit owner defaulted on the loan and vacated the unit. At the time, the unit owner was not only delinquent on his loan payments, but also owed "substantial sums" to the association for "unpaid monthly fees and other condominium assessments." After the unit owner vacated the unit, defendant changed the locks and winterized the property. (As the Appellate Division noted, "[w]interizing entails draining the pipes, turning off the water and setting the thermostat for heat to protect the pipes.") After the unite owner vacated the unit, plaintiff sued him to recover the delinquent fees. It later amended its complaint to include the lender, "alleging that [[the lender] was responsible for the association fees as it was in possession of the property."
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, holding that defendant was a mortgagee in possession and therefore was liable for the maintenance fees. On the key of issue of what it meant to be in "possession" of the unit, the trial court held as follows: "[D]efendant held the keys, and no one else [could] gain possession of the property without [defendant's] consent. This constitutes exclusive control, which indicates the status of mortgagee in possession." Defendant appealed.
Continue reading “When Is Possession Not Really Possession? (And By “Possession” I Mean In The “Mortgagee In Possession” Sense Of The Word)” →
I have never sent a telegram and would not know how to send one even if I wanted to. But, if you are so inclined, there is a somewhat quirky provision of New Jersey real estate law that would allow you to dust off your telegram machine and send one. This provision was the subject of a recent Appellate Division decision, Conley v. Guerrero, that attracted significant attention from the real estate community and may end up before the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Anyone who has bought or sold real estate in New Jersey is familiar with "attorney review." When you buy or sell a house, you sign a contract that is almost always prepared by a broker. The contract must contain a standard provision stating that the buyer and seller have the right to have an attorney review the contract. This "attorney review" period lasts three days. The contract becomes legally binding if, at the end of that three-day period, neither the buyer's nor the seller's attorney disapproves of the contract. If either side disapproves, their attorney must notify the other side's broker by "certified mail, telegram or by delivering it personally." The attorney must also notify the other attorney (or the party itself if they are not represented), but the law does not specify the manner in which this notice must be delivered. (Stay tuned for more on this later!)
In Conley, plaintiffs signed a form contract to purchase a condominium unit from sellers. It contained the standard "attorney review" provision. After signing the contract, but during the attorney review period, sellers received competing offers to purchase the property and eventually entered into a new contract to sell it to a new buyer for a higher price. Sellers' attorney therefore sent a disapproval of plaintiffs' contract to both plaintiffs' counsel and the broker (who was a duel agent represented both plaintiffs and seller). He sent the notice of disapproval via email, which plaintiffs' counsel and the agent acknowledged receiving within the attorney review period. Nonetheless, plaintiffs argued that the notice was ineffective because it was not sent in the proscribed manner — by certified mail, telegram, or hand delivery.
Continue reading “When Was The Last Time You Sent A Letter Via Telegram?” →
When my wife and I lived in Hoboken, one of our favorite restaurants was Court Street. It is located on the corner of Sixth Avenue and Court Street. We went there at least once a week for most of the time we lived in Hoboken. (Great food, good atmosphere, a little off the beaten path. You should check it out.) Little did I know at the time that we were looking out from the restaurant onto a "building" that was the subject of a long-running landlord-tenant dispute that was only recently resolved by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
I used quotation marks around "building" because the issue in Cashin v. Bello was whether the word "building" as used in the Anti-Eviction Act denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual that are located on the same parcel of land. This issue was more than just semantics to the parties involved because if the Supreme Court endorsed the former then defendant could be evicted, but if it endorsed the latter, then defendant could stay. Unfortunately for the tenant, the Supreme Court endorsed the former.
Continue reading “New Jersey Supreme Court Answers Burning Question: When is a converted garage a “building” under New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act?” →
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
It is not quite Ali-Frazier or even Gatti-Ward, but the New Jersey Supreme Court just delivered its third opinion in the past seven years regarding the free speech rights of residents in common interest communities (condos and co-ops). In Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue, Owners, Inc., the Court ruled that a resident who was a regular critic of the co-op's board of directors had the right to distribute leaflets under apartment doors throughout the building. (We previously wrote about the Appellate Division decision that the Supreme Court reviewed on appeal – look here.) The Court held that the co-op's "House Rule" purportedly banning all soliciting and distributing of written materials, including the resident's leaflets, was an unconstitutional abridgment of his free speech rights. In doing so, the Court clarified the standard that should generally be applied when evaluating similar issues — which arise frequently in common-interest communities — and described the types of restrictions that could be adopted without infringing on the free speech rights of residents.
Continue reading “Free Speech In Condos and Co-Ops: Round III Goes To The Resident” →
Kate Muscalino aims to answer that question in her recent article, "You May Have Recourse When A Court Denies Your Board Attorneys's Fees," which begins:
Collections have become an area of increasing concern for condominium associations, as some unit owners struggle to pay their common charges on time and in full. As unit owners' debt continues to rise, associations are left with few options to collect: a lien on the unit and a lawsuit against the individual unit owner.
Many condo associations have been frustrated in their attempts to collect from a unit owner individually, as judges are often sympathetic to delinquent unit owners, offering extensions, scrutinizing certifications of amounts due and reducing or eliminating the association's ability to collect attorneys' fees.
Click here for the rest of the article.