“Young Man, There’s A Place You Can Go . . .” (But That Place Might Not Be Immune From Liability Under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act If You Later Sue For Injuries You Suffered There)

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

These are not alternate lyrics to the the classic Village People song, YMCA, but they could be if the song were written by the Appellate Division panel that recently decided Lequerica v. Metropolitan YMCA of the Oranges.

In Lequerica, plaintiff was injured during a group strength and conditioning class at the YMCA. At one point, the instructor had the the class run toward a wall, touch it, and then return to the wall where they started. According to the Appellate Division:

On her return, plaintiff realized she was going too fast, and when she tried to stop she fell forward and hit her head "extremely hard" on the concrete wall in front of her. While running toward the wall, plaintiff was competing with a friend to see who could reach it first. Before she fell, plaintiff put her arm out in front of her friend in an effort to beat her to the wall. Plaintiff testified she was running so fast she felt she would not be able to stop at the wall, that she "tried to stop herself," and that ultimately, she "tripped."

Plaintiff suffered "a concussion, a large scalp laceration, and a left wrist fracture." She sued the YMCA and the instructor.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) they were immune from liability under the Charitable Immunity Act, and (2) plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of negligence. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the YMCA was not covered by the Charitable Immunity Act and that summary judgment was premature because discovery was not yet complete.

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We’ve Come A Long Way From Orange Slices At Halftime! Court Rejects Lawsuit Over Injury During Youth Soccer Match

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

If you thought that the yellow card that your child got at his or her soccer match (undeserved though I am sure it was) could never land you in court, you were wrong. In G.C. v. New Jersey Youth Soccer, the parents of a child who received a yellow card were sued by the parents of a child who was injured on the play that resulted in the yellow card. Here is how the Appellate Division described the play:

During the last two minutes of a close soccer match, twelve-year old [plaintiff] was dribbling the ball to take a shot at the goal . . . [Defendant] was trying to catch up with him and take the ball away. There was excitement as the game was close and time was running out. [Plaintiff] made a move for the ball, but he didn't have control of himself as he did and managed to catch the plaintiff after the shot went off.

The play resulted in a knee injury to plaintiff and a yellow card being issued to defendant because, according to the referee, he "contacted [plaintiff] in a manner that didn't confirm with normal level of play."

It also resulted in a lawsuit being filed by plaintiff's parents, on his behalf, against a number of parties, including the other child, several individuals, and various soccer clubs and associations. Plaintiff alleged negligence and reckless and intentional conduct on the part of all defendants. After discovery, each defendant moved for, and was granted, summary judgment. Plaintiff only appealed the grant of summary judgment to the other child.

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Back to Basics: Personal Guaranty Not Enforceable Without Consideration

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Sometimes the most basic things can cause the biggest problems. One of the first lessons learned in the first year of law school is that a valid contract requires consideration – some benefit flowing to each side of the deal. In M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. Amiel, the Appellate Division reminded us how failing to satisfy this basic requirement can derail an otherwise seemingly straightforward matter.

In Spiegel, defendants were two individuals who formed an LLC that operated two gas stations. The LLC purchased fuel oil from plaintiff. By March 2012, however, the LLC allegedly owned plaintiff more than $1 million for fuel oil deliveries, therefore plaintiff stopped making deliveries. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff entered into an agreement with the LLC pursuant to which the LLC agreed to make regular monthly payments to plaintiff to resolve its debt. As part of the agreement, the LLC entered into a promissory note with defendants for the full amount of the debt. Defendants were never asked to, and never agreed to, provide a personal guaranty in connection with the promissory note. But, shortly after the promissory note was signed, plaintiff asked defendants to sign a personal guaranty, which they did.

The LLC eventually defaulted on the promissory note, and plaintiff sued defendants to recover on the personal guaranty. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The only fact issue that either side raised was whether there was adequate consideration for the personal guaranty. Plaintiff asserted that the personal guarantee was provided to induce plaintiff to continue to supply fuel oil to the LLC’s gas stations, therefore there was adequate consideration and the guaranty should be enforced. Defendants countered that, by the time the personal guaranty was presented to them, the LLC had already made arrangements to purchase fuel oil from a new supplier and therefore the personal guaranty was void for lack of consideration.

The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendants’ cross-motion, holding that the guaranty was “clear and direct,” and that the “‘forbearance of the plaintiff to forego collection of the full amount’ and to ‘span out a payment plan’” provided adequate consideration. Defendants appealed and the Appellate Division reversed.

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Not So Breaking News: Residential Homeowners Still Not Liable If You Slip On Their Sidewalks

It seems like every week the Appellate Division issues a decision confirming, yet again, that residential property owners are not liable for slip-and-fall accidents that occur on their sidewalks. I have blogged about some of these cases here, here, here, and here. Apparently some plaintiffs have had enough, however, as the opening sentence in the Appellate Division's recent decision in Corry v. Barbieri makes clear:

In appealing the dismissal of their complaint, plaintiffs argue that "the time has come to abandon the unenlightened standard" that insulates residential landowners from liability for injuries caused by abutting sidewalks.

Unfortunately for plaintiffs in Corry, notwithstanding their pleas, the Appellate Division was not willing to change the law on residential landowner liability.

The facts in Corry were unfortunate but not uncommon. Plaintiff was walking with her family on the sidewalk in front of defendant's home when she tripped over a "raised and severely broken portion of the sidewalk." The fall caused her to suffer "a severe rotator cuff injury." She sued, defendants moved for summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion, she appealed.

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Lease “Signed Under Protest” Not Binding (And Have You Ever Heard Of “Grumbling Acceptance”?)

What happens if a tenant signs a lease but writes "signed under protest" under the signature? According to the Appellate Division, it means the lease is not binding. More importantly, perhaps, the Appellate Division has never heard of the contract theory known as "grumbling acceptance." If this is one that you did not cover in law school, join the club.

In Bergenline Property Group, LLC v. Coto, defendant was a longtime tenant of premises owned by plaintiff. There was an oral lease between the parties for most of the tenancy. But, in 2013, plaintiff served a notice to quit on defendant, requiring defendant to sign a written lease and pay a security deposit or vacate the property. Defendant refused and plaintiff served another notice to quit, requiring defendant to vacate the property for refusing to agree to reasonable changes to the terms of the lease. Defendant did not vacate and plaintiff filed an eviction complaint.

At the hearing on plaintiff's eviction complaint, the parties agreed to allow the court to determine the reasonableness of several provisions in the proposed lease and modify the lease as necessary. The court did just that, issuing a written opinion that modified some of the terms of the lease. Despite defendant's prior agreement to be bound by the court-modified lease, defendant refused to sign it. Plaintiff then moved for a judgment of possession. At the hearing on that request, the court gave defendant another chance to sign the lease. In response, Defendant first delivered a lease with a signature that was not witnessed and a post-dated check for the security deposit. Plaintiff refused to accept both. Defendant then delivered a lease, signed by defendant and witnessed by defendant's counsel, and a money order for the security deposit. However, directly below defendant's signature on the lease appeared the words "signed under protest." Plaintiff refused to accept this lease as well, but gave defendant one more chance to come to plaintiff's counsel's office and sign the lease. Defendant was apparently driven to plaintiff's counsel's office, but refused to leave the car or execute a new lease.

Plaintiff then renewed its request for a judgment of possession. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that the "signing under protest" language did not change the document, and stating, "parenthetically," that if plaintiff was "offended" by that language, plaintiff could strike it. The court entered the judgment of possession, finding that, by placing the "signing under protest" language on the lease, there was no meeting of the minds, and therefore no binding contract. As a result, defendant failed to sign the lease and violated the court's order requiring her to do so.

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