Size Matters: Seventh Circuit Rejects Subway Footlong Settlement Because It Provided No Meaningful Benefit To Class Members

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Subway (pd)I am a regular Subway customer, so I read the Seventh Circuit's opinion, In re. Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, with great interest. You probably remember the events that spawned this litigation. As the Seventh Circuit described it: "In January 2013 Matt Corby, an Australian teenager, purchased a Subway Footlong sandwich and, for reasons unknown, decided to measure it. The sandwich was only 11 inches long. He took a photo of the sandwich next to a tape measure and posted the photo on his Facebook page. Thus a minor social-media sensation was born." And, "[w]ithin days of Corby's post, the American class-action bar rushed to court," therefore, a class action lawsuit was also born. It ended a few years later with a settlement, which the Seventh Circuit just overturned.

To say that the Seventh Circuit was critical of the settlement would be an understatement. Its opinion is filled with subtle, and not so subtle, criticisms of the settlement and plaintiffs' counsel. For example, early in its opinion, the court observed: "In their haste to file suit [ ] the lawyers neglected to consider whether the claims had any merit. They did not." It did not get much better for plaintiffs from that point on.

The court noted that the parties engaged in limited, informal discovery early on in the case, with the intent of going to mediation. This discovery revealed that plaintiffs' claims were deficient. It showed that "the length of the [baked] bread has no effect on the quantity of food each customer receives." First, all of Subway's raw dough is exactly the same size. So, even the few rolls that bake to approximately a quarter-inch less than 12 inches because of natural, and unpreventable, "vagaries in the baking process" provide the same bread as those that bake to the full 12 inches. Second, Subway standardizes the amount of meat and cheese that its "sandwich artists" put on each sandwich, so whether the bread is 12 inches long or a quarter-inch short, the customer still gets the same amount of food. (In the interest of full disclosure, because I am a regular, I do occasionally get an extra slice of ham, salami, and pepperoni on my six-inch BMT at my local Subway.) "This early discovery, limited though it was, extinguished any hope of certifying a damages class."

"Rather than drop the suits as meritless," however, plaintiffs shifted the focus of the lawsuit from one seeking damages to one seeking injunctive relief. THey filed an amendec complaint and, after mediation, reached a settlement with Subway, under which Subway would, for four years, implement practices designed to ensure, the the extent possible, that its sandwich rolls measured at least 12 inches long. But, the settlement noted that "because of the inherent variability in food production and the bread baking process, Subway could not guarantee that each sandwich roll [would] always be exactly 12 inches or greater in length after baking." In other words, Subway would try to fix, but could not guarantee that it would fix, the problem that spawned the lawsuit. 

Continue reading “Size Matters: Seventh Circuit Rejects Subway Footlong Settlement Because It Provided No Meaningful Benefit To Class Members”

Court Approves Service Of Complaint Via Facebook, No Word On How Many “Likes” It Received

     by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Facebook (pd)Facebook is useful for a lot of things — humble bragging about your children, posting professionally taken candid photographs of your smiling family, announcing your engagement/marriage/pregnancy/baby's gender to several hundred of your closest friends, etc. In K.A. v. J.L., a New Jersey court added another item to this list. After observing that courts in other jurisdictions were almost evenly split on the issue, the court allowed plaintiffs in that case to serve defendant via Facebook. (When it researched the issue, I assume the court reviewed one of my prior posts about two New York courts that also allowed service via Facebook.)

K.A. involved very unusual facts. Plaintiffs sued defendant to "enjoin defendant from holding himself out as the father of their [adopted] son." Defendant, who was not the son's biological father of record, sent the son a friend request over Facebook. The son declined. Defendant then reached out to the son over Instagram, claiming that he was the son's biological father. Defendant allegedly informed the son that he knew where the son was born, and disclosed both the identity of the son's birth mother and that the son had "biological siblings at large." (Plaintiffs allege that defendant also sent a Facebook friend request to the son's sister, who, like the son, declined the invite.) Defendant also "incorporated a picture of [the son] into an image comprised of three separate photographs, each featuring a different person," and purportedly claimed that the collage was a picture of his children. Defendant shared this picture with the public on his Facebook account. Plaintiffs believe defendant obtained the image of the son from the son's Facebook account.

Plaintiffs claimed that defendant was a "complete stranger to them," and that they had no contact with him prior to the events that led to the litigation.  Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to serve cease and desist letters on defendant at his last known address via certified and regular mail. The certified letters were returned as unclaimed, but the letters sent by regular mail were never returned. Plaintiffs then sued, seeking an injunction preventing defendant from contacting their son or claiming to be his father. They sought permission from the court to serve the complaint on defendant via Facebook.

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Clear Arbitration Provision, Negotiated By Sophisticated Party While Represented By Counsel Deemed Enforceable

     by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Arbitration def (pd)The headline of this post is a little like "Dog bites man." But, given the recent trend in New Jersey of "man bites dog" type cases where courts have invalidated arbitration provisions that once seemed unambiguous (look here, here, and here for examples), the headline should make more sense.

In Columbus Circle NJ LLC v. Island Construction Co., LLC, the Appellate Division enforced an arbitration provision contained in a construction contract. Plaintiff was a single-member LLC that retained defendant to build a $1.9 million home on the bay in Avalon, New Jersey. Plaintiff's representative circulated an initial draft contract for the project that used the standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) forms. These forms contain a provision entitled "BINDING DISPUTE RESOLUTION," which, as the name suggests, requires the parties to choose "the method of binding dispute resolution" for any claims between them that are not resolved by mediation. In the draft it circulated, plaintiff's representative checked off "Arbitration pursuant to Section 15.4 of AIA Document A201-2007," rather than "Litigation in a court of competent jurisdiction." Before it was signed, the attorney for the LLC's sole member reviewed the draft and proposed changes, as did defendant, but none of these changes appear to have altered the dispute resolution provision.

During construction, disagreements arose between the parties regarding the cost of the project, leading both parties to terminate the contract. When mediation apparently failed, defendant filed a demand for arbitration. Three months later, plaintiff sued in state court. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and compel arbitration, and Plaintiff appealed.

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Victory For Commercial Affordable Housing

by:  Katharine A. Muscalino

Private commercial developers have struggled to install affordable housing in New Jersey’s municipalities for decades, facing opposition from communities, local governments, and the municipal zoning boards.  The Appellate Division has just eased the burden of private developers by holding, for the first time explicitly, that affordable housing built by a commercial developer (as opposed to a non-profit or public entity) qualifies as an “inherently beneficial use” in Conifer Realty LLC v. Township of Middle Zoning Board of Adjustment (September 9, 2011).  By being categorized as an inherently beneficial use, commercial affordable housing is subject to a less stringent standard for obtaining use variance relief.  In support of this holding, the Appellate division noted that the courts have previously recognized that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use in a “variety of circumstances” and that housing needs are “clearly related to the general welfare under the zoning laws.”

The Appellate Division found that the zoning board construed previous opinions holding that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use too narrowly.  The board had maintained that because all existing caselaw had addressed affordable housing constructed by public of non-profit entities, a commercial developer’s affordable housing could not qualify as an inherently beneficial use.  The Court directed that in analyzing whether a proposed use is inherently beneficial, “the focus of the inquiry is whether the proposal furthers the general welfare, not whether the undertaking is one that is not-for-profit or a commercial enterprise.”

In addition to remanding the application to the Board for consideration under the less stringent inherently beneficial use standard (the Sica test), the Appellate Division found the Board’s concerns regarding the negative criteria to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The Appellate Division noted that the Board’s rejection of the application, base on density and environmental concerns, was contradicted by the Township’s Fair Share plan, which included the project, minimized the environmental impact, and promised to amend the zoning and density for the project.

Who Says Babies Don’t Play Bocce? Law Division Rules On Age Restricted Housing Conversion

by: Gregory S. Ricciardi

With the continuing strain on residential development projects, some developers may seek relief in the form of a recent New Jersey law, which allows for the conversion of age-restricted projects to non age-restricted projects.  A recent opinion from the Law Division may serve as a helpful tool to developers seeking to take advantage of the law.

Heritage at Towne Lake, LLC v. Planning Board of Sayreville interprets and applies N.J.S.A. 45:45:22A-46.3 (the “Conversion Statute”), which regulates the conversion of age restricted units to non-age restricted units in development projects.  In this case, the Sayreville Planning Board (the “Board”) denied a developer’s application to convert a one hundred eighty-four (184) unit, age restricted community to a non-age restricted community, containing the same number of units, but configured differently. 

Pursuant to the Conversion Statute, the approving board has broad discretion to require the applicant to prove that the conversion can be granted  without substantial determinant  to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  The Conversion Statute establishes a set of criteria that applicants must prove, which include: (1) that the site meets RSIS standards; (2) recreation improvements and other amenities are revised, as needed, to meet the needs of the converted development; (3) water and sewer systems are adequately designed;  and (4) sufficient parking is available to accommodate the converted development. 

In addition to arguing that the applicant failed to meet the burden of proof as to the conditions of the Conversion Statute, the Board claimed that approving the conversion application would create a density violation.  Since the applicant received a density bonus for age-restricted development, if the conversion were approved, the Board argued that the project would require a (d) variance for density pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(5).  The court dismissed this argument, citing the plain meaning of the Conversion Statute, which states:

“No application for an amended approval seeking the authority to construct a converted development shall be considered a “use variance” or other “d variance” application pursuant to subsection d.  of section 57 of P.L.  1975, c 291 (C:4055D-70).”

The court ultimately concluded that the applicant had met its burden of proof and that the denial of the conversion application by the board was unreasonable.  The court remanded the matter back to the Board an ordered that the conversion be approved subject to the conversion of the originally proposed bocce courts to a “tot lot” for children.  

The Conversion Statute remains an attractive option for distressed, age-restricted development projects, provided the projects and the application for conversion can meet the statutory requirements, including a 20% set aside for affordable housing.    The publication of this decision helps shed light on the conversion process and eliminate confusion as to its application.