by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)
Cloaking devices are common in sci-fi movies like Star Trek and Star Wars. They are used to render an object, usually a spaceship, invisible to nearly all forms of detection. Although scientists are apparently working to make real-life cloaking devices, at this point they exist only in the movies and, apparently, in New Jersey courts, at least according to the Appellate Division in Amelio v. Gordon.
In Amelio, plaintiff owed an apartment building in Hoboken. He approached defendants about obtaining a loan to finish renovations on three units in the building, along with the common areas. Plaintiff claimed that defendants instructed him to create a corporate entity to obtain the loan. Plaintiff did as he was instructed, and formed a limited liability company, which obtained the loan from defendants. Plaintiff, who was identified as the managing member of the limited liability company, signed the loan documents on behalf of the company.
Plaintiff later sued, arguing that the fees and interest payments under the loan exceeded the amounts allowable under New Jersey's usury laws. He also claimed that defendants fraudulently convinced him to create a limited liability company and have that entity obtain the loan, just so they could charge him usurious fees and interest. Plaintiff sued in his individual capacity, not on behalf of the limited liability company. On the day of trial, defendants argued that the complaint had to be dismissed because plaintiff lacked standing to sue since the company was the borrower, not plaintiff. With little explanation, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.
Continue reading “On Cloaking Devices And Usury: Lender Can Be Sued If It Uses Corporate Shell To Cloak A Personal Loan As A Business Loan”
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)
In Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Justice Gorsuch delivered his first opinion for the Supreme Court, and in doing so, provided an interesting opinion on a relatively boring issue, and subconsciously (I assume) invoked the movie Repo Man, a classic (?) mid-1980's movie starring Emilio Estevez and Harry Dean Stanton, which the website, imdb.com, summarized as follows: "Young punk Otto [Estevez] becomes a repo man after helping to steal a car, and stumbles into a world of wackiness as a result."
Neither the facts nor the law in Henson were wacky. Plaintiffs took out loans from CitiFinancial Auto to buy cars, but later defaulted on those loans. Defendant purchased the defaulted loans and sought to collect the debt from plaintiffs in ways that plaintiffs claimed violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Act, which was designed to curtail "[d]isruptive dinnertime calls, downright deceit and more besides" authorizes private lawsuits and "weighty fines" for anyone who engages in "wayward collection practices." But, it only applies to "debt collectors," a term that is defined to include anyone who "regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another." The question in Henson was whether a party who purchases debts originated by someone else and then seeks to collect those debts for its own account qualifies as a debt collector." Justice Gorsuch framed the issue as follows:
Everyone agrees that the term ["debt collector"] embraces the repo man – someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding debt. What if you purchase a debt and then try to collect it for yourself – does that make you a "debt collector" too? That 's the nub of the dispute now before us.
The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sided with defendant, holding that a party that buys defaulted debt and collects it for its own account is not a "debt collector." In doing so, however, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that other circuit courts had come to the opposite conclusion. The U.S. Supreme Court took the case to clear up this split.
Continue reading “Supreme Court: Party That Buys Defaulted Debt Not A “Debt Collector” Under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act”
Me neither, but that is what happened in Glenn v. Duroseau. In fact, plaintiff in that case alleged that she not only left the money on the counter but that, when she went back a few minutes later, it was gone. To make matters worse, the security camera in the store did not work, so there was no way to tall exactly what happened. The trial court originally held this against the store owner, holding that he had a duty to plaintiff to ensure that the security cameras were working, but this decision was reversed on appeal.
In Glenn, plaintiff claimed that she walked into a UPS Store and placed her pocketbook on the counter, along with an envelope containing $600 in cash. When she left, she claimed that she took the pocketbook but not the envelope. She walked about four blocks away from the store before she realized that she was missing the envelope. When she returned to the store, the envelope was gone. She asked a store employee if he had seen it, but he responded that plaintiff did not leave an envelope in the store. Plaintiff became upset and called her boyfriend, who arrived and told the employee to give plaintiff her money back. The employee again denied that plaintiff had left an envelope in the store.
Plaintiff then called the police. When police officers arrived, they asked if the security cameras in the store were working. The employee did not know, but called his boss, who arrived on the scene and promised to review the tapes. However, it turned out that the security cameras were not working. Plaintiff sued the store owner, seeking the return of her $600.
Continue reading “Have You Ever Left $600 At The Counter Of A UPS Store?”
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
New Jersey is a "race-notice" jurisdiction when it comes to mortgage priority. What this means, in its simplest terms, is that if Party A obtains a mortgage on a piece of property before Party B does, but Party B records its mortgage first (i.e., it wins the "race" to the clerk's office), then Party B's mortgage has priority unless Party B had "actual knowledge" of Party A's previously-acquired interest. But what happens when a first mortgage is refinanced? The original mortgage is technically paid off and replaced with the refinanced mortgage. Does this "newly-recorded," refinanced mortgage maintain the first priority status of the original mortgage or does it go to the back of the line? The answer to this question — as discussed in a recent decision from the Law Division, Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Kim — is that the refinanced mortgage generally takes the original mortgage's first priority position.
In Kim, defendant borrowed $328,000 from Washington Mutual Bank, FA ("WaMu") to buy a home and secured repayment of this loan with a purchase money mortgage on the home. Later, defendant obtained a home equity loan from Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") that was also secured by a mortgage on defendant's home. Defendant then refinanced her original, purchase money mortgage with WaMu. Defendant used the entire amount of the refinance loan, which was secured by a mortgage on defendant's home, to pay off the original purchase money mortgage (i.e., she did not borrow and more money through the refinance) and the purchase money mortgage was discharged of record. WaMu did not obtain a subordination of the Wells Fargo mortgage in connection with the refinance.
Approximately three years after the refinancing, defendant defaulted on the Wells Fargo home equity loan, and Wells Fargo moved to foreclose. Defendant did not file a contesting answer and the court entered default against her. However, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. ("U.S. Bank"), the successor to WaMu's interest in the refinance loan and mortgage, filed a contesting answer claiming that its mortgage stood in first priority position ahead of Wells Fargo's mortgage.
Continue reading ““Get Your Priorities Straight!” Refinanced First Mortgage Maintains Priority Over Junior Liens”
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
One of my favorite causes of action is "champerty." I know what you are thinking — who has a favorite cause of action? Fair point. Nonetheless, champerty has always been (along with its cousins, barratry and maintenance) one of my favorites because it is a fun word to say and because it sounds so darn legal! You just sound more like a real lawyer when you say someone's conduct was "champertous." Don't believe me? Try it out.
For the uninitiated: "maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 425 (1978). Alas, although it is one of my favorites, I don't get to use champerty very often because it is not a recognized cause of action in New Jersey. Polo by Shipley v. Gotchel, 225 N.J. Super. 429, 434 (Ch. Div. 1987) ("This Court need not address the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, as they do not presently exist in New Jersey."). In fact, it has never been a recognized cause of action in the Garden State. Terney v. Wilson, 45 N.J.L. 282, 285 (Sup. Ct. 1883) ("Sometimes it has been held that the principle should not be applied to agreements of the character just mentioned because they are champertous, but as the English law against champerty is repudiated in New Jersey . . . .").
Continue reading “On Champerty, Barratry, And “Vexatious Litigants””