Last week, I wrote about an exception to the strict liability normally imposed on dog owners under New Jersey's dog bite statute. (A short time before that, I wrote about yet another exception to strict liability under the dog bite statute, so the exceptions are obviously more interesting than the rule.) This post is about a different dog bite case, Ward v. Ochoa, with a similar result even though it was not decided under the dog bite statute. Ward involved a home inspector who was attacked and severely injured while performing a home inspection. She sued the dog owners (who eventually settled) along with the real estate agency and real estate agent who were selling the house. Like the dog groomer in last week's post, however, the home inspector's claims were dismissed.
Although the temperature today is supposed to reach 90 degrees, this post is about frozen pipes. More specifically, pipes in a house that is under contract for sale that freeze and cause property damage after the scheduled, but not completed, closing, but before the buyer takes possession of the home. In a case like that, who is liable for the damage?
In Bianchi v. Ladjen, plaintiff was under contract to buy a home. It was an all cash sale, no mortgage was involved. The closing was scheduled for New Year's Eve. Plaintiff performed a walk through on the morning of the closing and reported no damage to, or issues with, the home. The closing could not be completed as scheduled, however, because plaintiff did not wire the balance of the purchase price to the title company prior to the closing as he had been instructed to do. Instead, plaintiff brought a certified check to the closing. As a result, the parties entered into an escrow agreement, which provided that the title company would hold "all closing proceeds" and the "Deed & Keys" in escrow until the check cleared.
This is where it gets tricky.
As readers of this blog know, arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are difficult to enforce in New Jersey. (Click here or here for a refresher.) There was some belief that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Clark might change this, but it does not appear, at least not yet, that it has. In a recent case, Defina v. Go Ahead and Jump 1, LLC d/b/a Sky Zone Indoor Trampoline Park, the Appellate Division was asked to revisit, in light of Kindred Nursing, its prior decision refusing to enforce an arbitration provision in a contract between a trampoline park and one of its customers. The Appellate Division did so, but affirmed its prior decision, holding that Kindred Nursing did not require New Jersey courts to change the manner in which they approach arbitration provisions.
I wrote about Defina in its first go-around with the Appellate Division — Bounce Around The (Court)Room: Trampoline Park's Arbitration Provision Deemed Unenforceable. The underlying facts of the case are unfortunate. A child fractured his ankle while playing "Ultimate Dodgeball" at a trampoline park. Before entering the facility, the child's father signed a document entitled, "Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk." The document contained an arbitration provision, which provided:
If there are any disputes regarding this agreement, I on behalf of myself and/or my child(ren) hereby waive any right I and/or my child(ren) may have to a trial and agree that such dispute shall be brought within one year of the date of this Agreement and will be determined by binding arbitration before one arbitrator to be administered by JAMS pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures. I further agree that the arbitration will take place solely in the state of Texas and that the substantive law of Texas shall apply.
Notwithstanding this provision, the child's parents sued the trampoline park in state court, alleging tort claims for simple negligence and gross negligence, and statutory claims for alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act.
Although I have been a homeowner for a number of years and like to think that I am reasonably handy, my knowledge of plumbing is probably more informed by Mario Brothers than anything else. As the saying goes, I know just enough about the subject to be dangerous, so I generally try to avoid it. One of the parties in a recent Appellate Division decision, Sayat Nova, LLC v. Koestner, probably would have been better served heading this advice, as the Appellate Division held that no expert was needed to show that it acted negligently when it broke a pipe in a clogged tub that caused flooding in a restaurant several floors down.
In Sayat Nova, plaintiff operated a restaurant in defendant's building. After water from a third-floor apartment came flooding like a "waterfall" out of the ceiling and into the restaurant, plaintiff sued. The incident that precipitated the lawsuit was not the first time that the restaurant flooded. Four times in the previous three years, water entered the restaurant from the same general area in the ceiling. Each incident "involved more water and more damage than the previous incident." Each time plaintiff notified defendant, but never received a response. On one prior occasion, after receiving no response from defendant, plaintiff hired contractors at his own expense to repair the damage. Plaintiff was never compensated for these expenses or any losses caused by the prior incidents.
In the incident that led to the complaint, water came into plaintiff's restaurant from the ceiling above a different area of the restaurant than in prior incidents. Moments after plaintiff noticed the intrusion, the building's superintendent entered the restaurant with a man plaintiff did not know. Neither man was a licensed plumber. The superintendent told plaintiff: "By mistake we broke the pipe . . . We try to fix the fixture, and the guy by mistake break the pipe." He was apparently referring to a pipe in a third-floor apartment with a "hair-clogged tub." After the incident, defendant called a licensed plumber to fix the problem, but the damage caused plaintiff to have to close his restaurant several days for repairs.
You don't need to be James Dalton to know that bar fights are scary. (If you don't know who James Dalton is, however, you do need to go watch Road House.) Bar fights can also create legal problems for bar owners. For example, do bar owners have a duty to keep their patrons safe from harm caused by fights? In Lloyd v. Underpass Enterprises, Inc. t/a The Harem, the Appellate Division dealt with this issue in the context of a somewhat unusual situation — a fight between two people that started in the club but ended up outside the club, and injured an individual who was not one of the combatants.
In Lloyd, plaintiff was playing "poker tournament style" in a hotel room with some co-workers, including Cecil George. After the game, they decided to visit a gentleman's club. George invited a friend, who had not been at the poker game, to join them at the club. About an hour after arriving, plaintiff saw George fighting with someone who "may have been" the friend George invited to the club. The club's bouncers broke up the fight, "escorted George and the other combatant outside to the parking lot," and then waited near the club's entrance. Plaintiff followed them out. The Appellate Division described what happened next:
[Plaintiff] was standing near George when he saw the other combatant rushing quickly, looking "menacing and coming at [them] with intent." [Plaintiff] stepped in between George and the person rushing at them to "put [him]self as a barrier between [the other combatant] and [George]." [Plaintiff] stated "[e]verything happened quickly." He awoke four days later in the hospital, having sustained a serious head injury.
Plaintiff sued the club. The club moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion. Plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.
I have written about the enforceability of waivers in health club membership agreements before, including just last week. Now the Appellate Decision has issued another decision on this same topic, Crossing-Lyons v. Town Sports International, Inc., which nicely illustrates the types of injuries that are covered by these agreements and those that are not.
In Stelluti, plaintiff was injured when the handlebars of her stationary bike dislodged and caused her to fall during a spin class. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that these injuries were covered under the broad release in plaintiff's membership agreement. It reasoned that exercising entails vigorous physical exertion (depending, of course, on the person exercising – I am not sure my time on the stationary bike this morning was terribly vigorous), and that the member assumes some risks — faulty equipment, improper use of equipment, inadequate instruction, inexperience, poor physical condition of the user, or excessive exertion — as a result. While a health club must maintain its premises in a condition safe from known or discoverable defects, it need not ensure the safety of members who voluntarily assume some risk by engaging in strenuous physical activities that have a potential to result in injuries.
New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA") is generally recognized as one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the country. It prohibits "any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation" that leads to an "ascertainable loss." But, certain "learned professionals" — doctors, lawyers, hospitals, etc. — are insulated from liability under the CFA. In Atlantic Ambulance Corporation v. Cullum, the Appellate Division added ambulance service providers to the list of "learned professionals" who are not subject to the CFA.
In Atlantic Ambulance, defendants received services from plaintiff, an ambulance service provider. After they failed to pay the bills for those services, plaintiff sued. In response, defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that they were overbilled by plaintiff in violation of the CFA. Defendants sought to bring their counterclaim as a class action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated people who were allegedly overcharged during a six-year period.
After five years of discovery, defendants moved for class certification. The trial court denied the motion for a number of reasons, only one of which is relevant for this post. Plaintiff argued that defendants could not maintain a cause of action under the CFA because they did not pay their bills, therefore they had not suffered any "ascertainable loss." The trial court agreed, expressly rejecting defendants' argument that an excessive bill from plaintiff, by itself, was enough to prove an ascertainable loss. Defendants appealed.