New Jersey Court Answers The Burning Question: Can I Sue The Owner Of An Abandoned Church If I Slip And Fall On The Sidewalk Outside The Church?

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

The facts and legal issues in sidewalk slip and fall cases sometimes read like they are pulled from law school final exams. In New Jersey, the baseline legal rule is clear — owners of commercial properties generally have a duty to maintain, in reasonably good condition, the sidewalks abutting their property, while owners of residential properties do not. But does a property owner have a duty to maintain its sidewalks when:

the property is both residential and commercial, like a multi-family home where one unit is owner occupied and the others are rented (click here for more on that, but the short answer is that it depends on whether the property is primarily residential or primarily commercial ); or
the plaintiff is a tenant and sues the landlord after slipping on a sidewalk outside the rental property (click here for more on that, but usually, yes); or
the property is a commercial property, final judgment of foreclosure has been entered in favor of the lender, but no sheriff's sale has been scheduled (click here for more on that, but if the lender can be considered a mortgagee in possession, then yes); or
the property is owned by a condominium or common-interest community (click here for more, but generally, yes if it's a private sidewalk within the condominium, no if it's a public sidewalk abutting the condominium); or
the property is residential and the fall is caused by sweetgum spikey seed pods that fell from a tree on the defendant's property (click here, but, no).

And now one more can be added to the list thanks to the Appellate Division's decision is Ellis v. Hilton United Methodist Church, where the question presented was whether "sidewalk liability applies to an owner of a vacant church."

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Federal Reserve Approves Colorado Credit Union To Serve Cannabis Industy (But There’s A Catch)

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the Federal Reserve conditionally approved a Colorado credit union, Fourth Corner Credit Union, to serve cannabis-linked businesses. To obtain this approval, however, the credit union had to “step back from its original plan to serve state-licensed dispensaries.” Instead, it will focus on “individuals and companies that support legalized marijuana, including those who partner with vendors, such as accountants and landlords.” In other words, the credit union can service individuals and entities involved in the cannabis industry, but not those who “touch the plant.”

Read the full article here.

This Is The Landlord-Tenant Equivalent Of Accusing Your Spouse Of Stealing The Covers

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

And, incidentally, it ends the same way. (At least the same way it always ends for me.) No. You are wrong. Your spouse did not steal the covers.

In Loiacano v. Salemne, defendants stopped paying rent to their landlord. The landlord sued to evict them for non-payment. Defendants responded by requesting a "Marini hearing." In New Jersey, tenants are almost never allowed to withhold rent from their landlords. But, in Marini v. Ireland, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized an exception to this rule. If a landlord refuses to make repairs that are necessary to keep the property habitable, then the tenant can make the repairs and withhold an amount from their monthly rent that is equal to the costs of the repairs. If a tenant does this and is then sued for non-payment, the court conducts a "Marini hearing" to determine whether the tenant was justified in doing so.

What made Loiacano unique was that defendants were not claiming that the landlord did anything wrong or failed to make any repairs. Instead, they claimed that they withheld "two months' rent on the basis that their downstairs neighbor was manipulating the heat in their apartment." It wasn't even the downstairs neighbor herself who was allegedly doing this. Instead, it was her boyfriend, "identified only as 'Ray.'" Defendants, who had a "contentious relationship" with Ray, alleged that he would "manipulate[] the heat [in the first-floor apartment] so that there would be no heat in defendants' second floor apartment."

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Homeowner not liable for sweetgum spiky seed pod slip and fall

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

In the past, I have written about whether property owners can be liable for slip-and-fall accidents caused by ice and snow on their sidewalks. (Click here, here, and here for examples.) This is the first time I will address the related topic of whether property owners can be liable for accidents caused by "spiky seed pods" that fall from sweetgum trees on their property. Turns out that the source of the slippery sidewalk does not change the law too much for residential property owners.

In Neilson v. Dunn, plaintiff was injured when she slipped on spiky seed pods that fell from a sweetgum tree on defendant's property onto an adjacent sidewalk. The tree had been on defendant's property since she and her husband bought it, and plaintiff knew that there were seed pods on the sidewalk when she began her walk. Defendant also "employ[ed] a lawn maintenance contractor whose services include fall and spring clean ups." The most recent clean up occurred two month's prior to plaintiff's accident.

After plaintiff sued, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she could not be liable for plaintiff's injuries because she had neither created nor exacerbated a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. She argued that the "seed pod accumulation" was a natural condition over which she had no control, and that she acted reasonably in retaining a lawn maintenance service to "periodically clean up any debris, [including the seed pods,] on her lawn and sidewalk." Plaintiff countered that defendant had a duty to ensure that her property was spiky seed pod free and that her failure to do so created a hazardous condition.

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Lease “Signed Under Protest” Not Binding (And Have You Ever Heard Of “Grumbling Acceptance”?)

What happens if a tenant signs a lease but writes "signed under protest" under the signature? According to the Appellate Division, it means the lease is not binding. More importantly, perhaps, the Appellate Division has never heard of the contract theory known as "grumbling acceptance." If this is one that you did not cover in law school, join the club.

In Bergenline Property Group, LLC v. Coto, defendant was a longtime tenant of premises owned by plaintiff. There was an oral lease between the parties for most of the tenancy. But, in 2013, plaintiff served a notice to quit on defendant, requiring defendant to sign a written lease and pay a security deposit or vacate the property. Defendant refused and plaintiff served another notice to quit, requiring defendant to vacate the property for refusing to agree to reasonable changes to the terms of the lease. Defendant did not vacate and plaintiff filed an eviction complaint.

At the hearing on plaintiff's eviction complaint, the parties agreed to allow the court to determine the reasonableness of several provisions in the proposed lease and modify the lease as necessary. The court did just that, issuing a written opinion that modified some of the terms of the lease. Despite defendant's prior agreement to be bound by the court-modified lease, defendant refused to sign it. Plaintiff then moved for a judgment of possession. At the hearing on that request, the court gave defendant another chance to sign the lease. In response, Defendant first delivered a lease with a signature that was not witnessed and a post-dated check for the security deposit. Plaintiff refused to accept both. Defendant then delivered a lease, signed by defendant and witnessed by defendant's counsel, and a money order for the security deposit. However, directly below defendant's signature on the lease appeared the words "signed under protest." Plaintiff refused to accept this lease as well, but gave defendant one more chance to come to plaintiff's counsel's office and sign the lease. Defendant was apparently driven to plaintiff's counsel's office, but refused to leave the car or execute a new lease.

Plaintiff then renewed its request for a judgment of possession. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that the "signing under protest" language did not change the document, and stating, "parenthetically," that if plaintiff was "offended" by that language, plaintiff could strike it. The court entered the judgment of possession, finding that, by placing the "signing under protest" language on the lease, there was no meeting of the minds, and therefore no binding contract. As a result, defendant failed to sign the lease and violated the court's order requiring her to do so.

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