Court Bounces Trampoline Park’s Arbitration Provision

 by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Sky zone (pd)A few months ago, I wrote about the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a case involving a child who was injured at a trampoline park ("Bounce Around The (Court)Room: Trampoline Park's Arbitration Provision Deemed Unenforceable"). In that case, the trampoline park moved to compel arbitration, but the court denied the motion, holding that the waiver was unenforceable under the New Jersey Supreme Court's seminal decision in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Group, L.P, because there was no clear and unambiguous statement that plaintiff was waiving the right to sue in court to obtain relief. Today, the Appellate Division released its decision in Weed v. Sky NJ, LLC, which involved a similar issue at a similar trampoline park and in which, unfortunately for the trampoline park, the court arrived at the same conclusion (albeit for different reasons).

In Weed, plaintiff, a minor, went to a SkyZone trampoline park. Before being allowed to jump, her mother was required to sign a document with a title only a lawyer could love — "Conditional Access Agreement, Pre-Injury Waiver of Liability, and Agreement to Indemnity, Waiver of Trial, and Agreement to Arbitrate" (the "Agreement") Having apparently read my blog about the enforceability of these types of agreements at trampoline parks, the Agreement explained, in some detail, that, by signing the Agreement, the participant was waiving the right to sue in court, the right to trial by jury, etc. Plaintiff's mother signed it, and plaintiff's visit to the park on this occasion was apparently uneventful.

Not so when she returned several months later. On that visit, plaintiff was accompanied by a friend and her friend's mother. Both children were again required to sign the Agreement before being allowed to jump. Plaintiff's friend's mother signed on behalf of both children. Notably, the Agreement required that an adult signing on behalf of a child had to be the child's parent or legal guardian, or had to have been granted power of attorney to sign on behalf of the child. Plaintiff's friend's mother did not meet these requirements, but nonetheless signed the Agreement and plaintiff and her friend were allowed to enter. Plaintiff was injured during this visit to the park and sued. 

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Unenforceable Clause In Arbitration Agreement Does Not Void Agreement

 by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Arbitration (pd)One of my children's preschool teachers was fond of saying, "you get what you get and you don't get upset." (Not to my little angel, of course, but to other children.) In Curran v. Curran, the Appellate Division basically applied this admonition to the parties to an arbitration agreement, holding that they got what they intended out of the agreement, therefore they could not argue, after the fact, that an unenforceable provision in the agreement voided the entire agreement.

In Curran, plaintiff filed for divorce from defendant. With the advice of counsel, the parties entered into a consent order to refer all issues incident to their divorce to arbitration under the New Jersey Arbitration Act. In the consent order, the parties acknowledged that any arbitration award that was entered could only be set aside or modified by a court under the limited grounds set forth in the Arbitration Act — e.g., the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means, the court found evidence of "evident partiality" by the arbitrator, the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, etc.  But the parties also included a handwritten provision, which provided: "The parties reserve their rights to appeal the arbitrator's award to the appellate division as if the matter was determined by the trial court." This is the provision that would cause all of the problems.

After the arbitrator entered a preliminary award, plaintiff requested reconsideration. The arbitrator then issued a comprehensive award setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed a motion in the Law Division for an order modifying the award, citing eight alleged "mistakes of law" made by the arbitrator. Plaintiff also argued that the intent of the handwritten provision was not to allow for direct appeal to the Appellate Division, but was instead was evidence that the parties intended a more searching review of the award that what would normally be allowed under the Arbitration Act. The trial court agreed, holding that the paragraph itself was unenforceable because it purported to "create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement." The trial court noted that "[t]he authority of a court to hear and determine certain classes of cases rests solely with the Constitution and the Legislature." But the trial court agreed with plaintiff that the handwritten provision demonstrated the parties' intent to provide for "a little more review" than what would normally be allowed under the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the trial court "in essence act[ed] as the Appellate Division of the arbitrator." It performed a comprehensive review of the arbitrator's decision and affirmed the award. 

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Transfer Made On The Morning Of Sheriff’s Sale, For The Purpose Of Delaying The Sheriff’s Sale, Deemed Fraudulent

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Auction (pd)Sometimes you read decisions and you don't understand how the court arrived at its conclusion based on the facts of the case. Then other times, the conclusion just makes sense. These are the decisions you read and think to yourself, "of course you can't do that." The Appellate Division's opinion in 5 Perry Street, LLC v. Southwind Properties, LLC, is one of these cases.

In Perry Street, defendants were a limited liability corporation and the sole member of that corporation. The corporate defendant owned property in Cape May that it operated as a bed and breakfast.Two "non-institutional lenders" held mortgages on the property. After they foreclosed and obtained a final judgment of foreclosure, a sheriff's sale was scheduled. The corporate defendant obtained four adjournments of the sheriff's sale and attempted to refinance the property, but was "unable to consummate a transaction" before the sheriff's sale. 

Instead, the day before the sheriff's sale, the individual defendant filed for bankruptcy. She then transferred the underlying property from the corporate defendant to herself. The consideration for the transfer was $1 and the "Balance of outstanding mortgages $80,000.00." The $1 consideration was typed into the deed, but the individual defendant hand wrote the part about the outstanding mortgages. She claimed that her intent was to "assume personal liability for the mortgages," but the Appellate Division noted that the balance of the mortgages at the time was almost $250,000, not $80,000, and that other documents she signed reflected that the only consideration was $1. She "filed the deed the next day, an hour and a half before the Sheriff's sale."  

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We’ve Come A Long Way From Orange Slices At Halftime! Court Rejects Lawsuit Over Injury During Youth Soccer Match

 by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

 

Yellow card (pd)

If you thought that the yellow card that your child got at his or her soccer match (undeserved though I am sure it was) could never land you in court, you were wrong. In G.C. v. New Jersey Youth Soccer, the parents of a child who received a yellow card were sued by the parents of a child who was injured on the play that resulted in the yellow card. Here is how the Appellate Division described the play:

During the last two minutes of a close soccer match, twelve-year old [plaintiff] was dribbling the ball to take a shot at the goal . . . [Defendant] was trying to catch up with him and take the ball away. There was excitement as the game was close and time was running out. [Plaintiff] made a move for the ball, but he didn't have control of himself as he did and managed to catch the plaintiff after the shot went off.

The play resulted in a knee injury to plaintiff and a yellow card being issued to defendant because, according to the referee, he "contacted [plaintiff] in a manner that didn't confirm with normal level of play."

It also resulted in a lawsuit being filed by plaintiff's parents, on his behalf, against a number of parties, including the other child, several individuals, and various soccer clubs and associations. Plaintiff alleged negligence and reckless and intentional conduct on the part of all defendants. After discovery, each defendant moved for, and was granted, summary judgment. Plaintiff only appealed the grant of summary judgment to the other child.

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Transfer Can Be Fraudulent Even If It Occurs Before Loan, Default, And Lawsuit Over Default On Loan

Fraud (PD)A recent Appellate Division decision should serve as a warning to anyone thinking about transferring assets and rendering themselves judgment proof before entering into a business deal. If the deal goes bad, the transfer might be deemed fraudulent and creditors might be able to look to the fraudulently transferred assets to satisfy their judgments. 

In Anastasi v. Barmbatsis, defendants, husband and wife, held all of the shares in a single-purpose entity that owned and operated a Stewart's Root Beer in Franklin Park, New Jersey. Shortly before procuring a loan to open a new Stewart's location with a partner, husband transferred his interest in the entity to wife, along with nearly all of his interest in another entity that the two owned. Husband then entered into a deal with plaintiff — verbal, but "apparently sealed with a handshake" — to borrow $50,000 to use to open the new restaurant. Defendants used this money, along with other funds, to open the restaurant.

Husband agreed to repay the loan in five to seven months. This was subsequently extended but husband failed to repay the loan even with the extension. Plaintiff sued and obtained a default judgment against husband for $50,000. In post-judgment discovery, plaintiff learned about the pre-loan transfers from husband to wife. Thereafter, he sued both husband and wife alleging, among other things, that the transfers violated New Jersey's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (the "UFTA"). The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor. It held that wife was not personally responsible for paying back the loan, but plaintiff could satisfy his judgment with the interests in the two entities that husband had transferred to wife.

 

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