Dog (Bite) Days of Summer, Part I: Owners Usually, But Not Always, Strictly Liable For Dog Bites

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Beware of dog (pd)As dog owners in New Jersey know, or should know, they are usually strictly liable for injuries suffered by anyone bitten by their dogs. New Jersey does not follow a "one free bite rule." Instead, under New Jersey law: "The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness."

There are, however, exceptions to this rule. For example, trespassers, who are obviously not "lawfully on or in a private place," cannot sue under the dog bite statute. A different exception was at play in Carpentiero v. Pocknett, where a dog groomer was bitten in the face by a dog while bathing the dog. In that case, defendant brought her dog to Katie's Pet Depot, where plaintiff, an independent contractor, worked as a part-time pet groomer. Plaintiff testified that had she been advised that the dog was old and had arthritis, she would have "muzzled the dog prior to grooming." But she was never told that, therefore she did not muzzle the dog, and, while she was bathing the dog, she was bitten in the face.  

Continue reading “Dog (Bite) Days of Summer, Part I: Owners Usually, But Not Always, Strictly Liable For Dog Bites”

Arbitration Provision Bounced Again, Even After Kindred Nursing Decision.

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Arbitration (pd)As readers of this blog know, arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are difficult to enforce in New Jersey. (Click here or here for a refresher.) There was some belief that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Clark might change this, but it does not appear, at least not yet, that it has. In a recent case, Defina v. Go Ahead and Jump 1, LLC d/b/a Sky Zone Indoor Trampoline Park, the Appellate Division was asked to revisit, in light of Kindred Nursing, its prior decision refusing to enforce an arbitration provision in a contract between a trampoline park and one of its customers. The Appellate Division did so, but affirmed its prior decision, holding that Kindred Nursing did not require New Jersey courts to change the manner in which they approach arbitration provisions.

I wrote about Defina in its first go-around with the Appellate Division — Bounce Around The (Court)Room: Trampoline Park's Arbitration Provision Deemed Unenforceable. The underlying facts of the case are unfortunate. A child fractured his ankle while playing "Ultimate Dodgeball" at a trampoline park. Before entering the facility, the child's father signed a document entitled, "Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk." The document contained an arbitration provision, which provided: 

If there are any disputes regarding this agreement, I on behalf of myself and/or my child(ren) hereby waive any right I and/or my child(ren) may have to a trial and agree that such dispute shall be brought within one year of the date of this Agreement and will be determined by binding arbitration before one arbitrator to be administered by JAMS pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures. I further agree that the arbitration will take place solely in the state of Texas and that the substantive law of Texas shall apply.

Notwithstanding this provision, the child's parents sued the trampoline park in state court, alleging tort claims for simple negligence and gross negligence, and statutory claims for alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act. 

Continue reading “Arbitration Provision Bounced Again, Even After Kindred Nursing Decision.”

Law And The Simpsons, Lesson One: Trampolines=Potential Lawsuits

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

I know trampolines are fun, but everyone should know, thanks to The Simpsons, that they are a recipe for (legal) disaster:

Apparently some people missed this episode, as a recent decision from the Appellate Division, Panico v. Winner, demonstrates. [Note: In the second week of my first-year torts class, our professor told us that we were having a pop quiz. Being first-year law students, we all panicked. But then he shut off the lights and played this clip and we discussed all of the potential legal issues. It was a relief that it was not a quiz, but unfortunately this was the high point of my first-year torts class.]

In Panico, plaintiff was injured while jumping on a trampoline at a graduation party. The party was held at one of his classmate's homes and was attended by approximately twenty teenage guests. His classmate's mother originally planned to attend the party and serve as chaperone, but later learned that she would not be able to attend because of a work obligation. She told her daughter that she would have to cancel the party unless her daughter could convince the daughter's grandparents to attend. The daughter was able to do so. Her grandparents attended the party and, as a reward, became defendants in a lawsuit. 

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Another Day, Another Lawsuit About Injuries Suffered At A Gym (Another Reason For Me Not To Go To The Gym)

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Weight lifters (pd)
I have written about the enforceability of waivers in health club membership agreements before, including just last week. Now the Appellate Decision has issued another decision on this same topic, Crossing-Lyons v. Town Sports International, Inc., which nicely illustrates the types of injuries that are covered by these agreements and those that are not.

First, a little background. The two seminal cases on this issue are Stelluti v. Casapenn and Walters v. YMCA , both of which I have written about before.

In Stelluti, plaintiff was injured when the handlebars of her stationary bike dislodged and caused her to fall during a spin class. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that these injuries were covered under the broad release in plaintiff's membership agreement. It reasoned that exercising entails vigorous physical exertion (depending, of course, on the person exercising – I am not sure my time on the stationary bike this morning was terribly vigorous), and that the member assumes some risks — faulty equipment, improper use of equipment, inadequate instruction, inexperience, poor physical condition of the user, or excessive exertion — as a result. While a health club must maintain its premises in a condition safe from known or discoverable defects, it need not ensure the safety of members who voluntarily assume some risk by engaging in strenuous physical activities that have a potential to result in injuries.  

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Waiver In Gym Membership Agreement Not Too Broad And Not Barred By TCCWNA

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Contract(pd)Gym memberships are notoriously difficult to cancel. As a result, there is a fair amount of litigation over the cancellation, or attempted cancellation, of gym memberships, many of which are class actions. A recent Appellate Division decision, Mellet v. Aquasid, LLC, was one such lawsuit. As an added bonus, the decision also involves the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (TCCWNA), a once relatively obscure statute that has recently become popular — or controversial depending on which side of a lawsuit you find yourself — and about which I have written here and here.

In Mellet, defendant was a health club. Plaintiffs were members of the health club. Plaintiffs attempted to cancel their memberships but their requests were declined and the health club continued to bill each of them. When plaintiffs failed to pay, defendant attempted to collect these unpaid fees — which included monthly dues, late fees, collection fees, and administrative fees –  from plaintiffs. In response, plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging that defendant's membership agreement and the fees it charged violated New Jersey law, including TCCWNA. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification and plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, plaintiffs raised a number of issues, but the most interesting one involved its claim that the broad waiver in the membership agreement violated TCCWNA. It provides, in part, that "[n]o seller . . . shall . . . enter into any written  consumer contract  . . . which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller . . . as established by State or Federal law at the time." Its purpose was to prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts by prohibiting the use of illegal terms or warranties, but it has become a favorite of plaintiff's attorneys because consumers can sue under TCCWNA even if they have suffered no injury or loss, and because the statute allows successful plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees as part of their damages. 

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“Young Man, There’s A Place You Can Go . . .” (But That Place Might Not Be Immune From Liability Under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act If You Later Sue For Injuries You Suffered There)

     by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

YMCA (pd)These are not alternate lyrics to the the classic Village People song, YMCA, but they could be if the song were written by the Appellate Division panel that recently decided Lequerica v. Metropolitan YMCA of the Oranges.

In Lequerica, plaintiff was injured during a group strength and conditioning class at the YMCA. At one point, the instructor had the the class run toward a wall, touch it, and then return to the wall where they started. According to the Appellate Division:

On her return, plaintiff realized she was going too fast, and when she tried to stop she fell forward and hit her head "extremely hard" on the concrete wall in front of her. While running toward the wall, plaintiff was competing with a friend to see who could reach it first. Before she fell, plaintiff put her arm out in front of her friend in an effort to beat her to the wall. Plaintiff testified she was running so fast she felt she would not be able to stop at the wall, that she "tried to stop herself," and that ultimately, she "tripped."

Plaintiff suffered "a concussion, a large scalp laceration, and a left wrist fracture." She sued the YMCA and the instructor.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) they were immune from liability under the Charitable Immunity Act, and (2) plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of negligence. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the YMCA was not covered by the Charitable Immunity Act and that summary judgment was premature because discovery was not yet complete.

Continue reading ““Young Man, There’s A Place You Can Go . . .” (But That Place Might Not Be Immune From Liability Under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act If You Later Sue For Injuries You Suffered There)”

Climbing A Light Pole Is Incidental To Fixing The Light At The Top, Therefore Property Owner Not Liable For Independent Contractor’s Injuries

by:  Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Parking lot lights (pd)On this blog I have occasionally written about the duty owed by landowners to, among others, visitors and trespassers and folks walking along a landowner's sweetgum-spiky-seed-pod-riddled sidewalk. In Pisieczko v. The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, the Appellate Division addressed a similar situation — the duty owed by a landowner to an independent contractor performing work on its property. 

In Pisiaczko, plaintiff was an independent contractor who worked for defendant "doing odd jobs, such as repairing different fixtures, changing lights, and installing tiles." In this capacity, he was hired by defendant to repair lights, which were "affixed to wooden poles" and located in one of defendant's parking lots. Defendant provided no guidance or supervision to plaintiff. Before beginning his work, plaintiff pushed on one of the wooden poles to make sure it was sturdy. When it did not move, he took a ladder, leaned it against the pole, and extended it to approximately two feet below the light fixture. He secured the ladder with straps around the pole. Unfortunately, while plaintiff was on the ladder testing the fixture, the pole broke. Plaintiff jumped off the ladder from about 20 feet to avoid falling into barbed wire. He injured his heel in the process.

Plaintiff sued. He alleged that the pole was rotten inside, which caused it to break. (The parties agreed that the rot was not visible before the pole broke.) Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for plaintiff's damages because the decision to place the ladder against the pole was incident to the specific work plaintiff was hired to perform.  The trial court agreed and granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.

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