by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)
It is always helpful when a court lets you know up front what its decision is all about. This was the case in Adelman v. BSI Financial Services, Inc., where the Appellate Division began its decision as follows: "A defendant in a foreclosure case may not fail to diligently pursue a germane defense and then pursue a civil case against the lender alleging fraud by foreclosure." Definitely not burying the lede (or is it burying the "lead"?).
In Adelman, plaintiff was the executrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Norman. Before they were married, Norman entered into a loan with his lender that was secured by a mortgage on his home. Three years later, the loan went into default, and six months after that, the lender filed a foreclosure complaint. Norman offered no defense to the complaint, and default was entered. Three months after that, he began discussing the possibility of a loan modification with the lender. However, Norman's chances for a successful modification ended when he could not make the first payment under the proposed modification and when a title search revealed five other liens on the property.
Months later, final judgment of foreclosure was entered. Norman did not object to the entry of final judgment. One year after that, the property was sold at sheriff's sale, and nine months after the sale, the lender filed a motion to remove Norman from the property. Only then, for the first time, did Norman argue, in a motion to stay his removal from the property, that the foreclosure was improper because the loan modification cured the default. The court denied this motion. Plaintiff appealed but then withdrew the appeal. Ultimately, shortly after Norman passed, and more than five years after the loan went into default, plaintiff vacated the property.
Continue reading “Borrower Cannot Abandon Germane Defense To Foreclosure And Later Sue For Damages Based On That Defense”
This might have seemed obvious, but the Appellate Division nonetheless recently confirmed that a borrower's claim that it "read something wrong" could not establish "excusable neglect" sufficient to vacate a final judgment of foreclosure.
In New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency v. Wolinski, borrowers defaulted on their mortgage and their lender filed a foreclosure complaint. The first complaint named borrowers and "John Doe and Jane Doe 1-10 (Names Being Fictitious) Tenants/Occupants." This complaint was voluntarily dismissed against all parties, real and fictitious. The second complaint, filed approximately six months later, also named borrowers and "John Doe and Jane Doe 1-10 (Names Being Fictitious) Tenants/Occupants." This complaint was also voluntary dismissed, but only as to the fictitious defendants.
Borrowers never answered the complaint and the lender filed a request to enter default, and then obtained final judgment by default. The lender scheduled a sheriff's sale but the borrowers filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender moved to lift the bankruptcy stay. After this motion was granted, the borrowers moved to vacate final judgment. They argued: (1) that they misread the dismissal of the second foreclosure complaint to be, like the dismissal of the first one, a dismissal of all defendants, not just the fictitious ones; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it allegedly miscalculated the amount due in the final judgment. The Appellate Division rejected both of these arguments.
Continue reading “Borrowers Cannot Vacate Final Judgment Of Foreclosure Because They “Read Something Wrong””
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
One of my favorite causes of action is "champerty." I know what you are thinking — who has a favorite cause of action? Fair point. Nonetheless, champerty has always been (along with its cousins, barratry and maintenance) one of my favorites because it is a fun word to say and because it sounds so darn legal! You just sound more like a real lawyer when you say someone's conduct was "champertous." Don't believe me? Try it out.
For the uninitiated: "maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 425 (1978). Alas, although it is one of my favorites, I don't get to use champerty very often because it is not a recognized cause of action in New Jersey. Polo by Shipley v. Gotchel, 225 N.J. Super. 429, 434 (Ch. Div. 1987) ("This Court need not address the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, as they do not presently exist in New Jersey."). In fact, it has never been a recognized cause of action in the Garden State. Terney v. Wilson, 45 N.J.L. 282, 285 (Sup. Ct. 1883) ("Sometimes it has been held that the principle should not be applied to agreements of the character just mentioned because they are champertous, but as the English law against champerty is repudiated in New Jersey . . . .").
Continue reading “On Champerty, Barratry, And “Vexatious Litigants””
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
Tax sale foreclosures are rarely that interesting. This is purely my opinion, and I understand that buying tax sale certificates can be a lucrative trade, but I think I am probably not alone in saying that the field tends to be a bit dry. This is not always the case, however, and the best proof of this might be the recent decision in Lien Times, LLC v. Rader. (It is not what makes the case interesting, but Lien Times is a great name for an entity that buys tax liens.)
Lien Times started out with a fairly routine set of facts. Defendants fell behind on the taxes for their home, so the township issued a Certificate of Sale for unpaid municipal tax liens. Plaintiff purchased the Certificate of Sale. Plaintiff eventually foreclosed on the lien and the property was auctioned at a sheriff's sale . This is where it gets interesting.
Continue reading “If Courts Awarded Points For Creativity, These Defendants Might Have Received A Few!”
by: Peter J. Gallagher
Courts don't often impose sanctions for frivolous litigation, but when they do, it usually involves something unusual (apologies to John Winger). Unusual — and perhaps even unfortunate — would be the only way to describe the facts of a recent decision from the Appellate Division that revived a party's request for legal fees in a case involving a failed (alleged) engagement and the return of a (purported) engagement ring that the recipient initially claimed to have lost, but later (apparently) found.
Continue reading “Hell Hath No Fury Like . . . An Angry Litigant And Former Fiance?”