Size Matters: Seventh Circuit Rejects Subway Footlong Settlement Because It Provided No Meaningful Benefit To Class Members

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

I am a regular Subway customer, so I read the Seventh Circuit's opinion, In re. Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, with great interest. You probably remember the events that spawned this litigation. As the Seventh Circuit described it: "In January 2013 Matt Corby, an Australian teenager, purchased a Subway Footlong sandwich and, for reasons unknown, decided to measure it. The sandwich was only 11 inches long. He took a photo of the sandwich next to a tape measure and posted the photo on his Facebook page. Thus a minor social-media sensation was born." And, "[w]ithin days of Corby's post, the American class-action bar rushed to court," therefore, a class action lawsuit was also born. It ended a few years later with a settlement, which the Seventh Circuit just overturned.

To say that the Seventh Circuit was critical of the settlement would be an understatement. Its opinion is filled with subtle, and not so subtle, criticisms of the settlement and plaintiffs' counsel. For example, early in its opinion, the court observed: "In their haste to file suit [ ] the lawyers neglected to consider whether the claims had any merit. They did not." It did not get much better for plaintiffs from that point on.

The court noted that the parties engaged in limited, informal discovery early on in the case, with the intent of going to mediation. This discovery revealed that plaintiffs' claims were deficient. It showed that "the length of the [baked] bread has no effect on the quantity of food each customer receives." First, all of Subway's raw dough is exactly the same size. So, even the few rolls that bake to approximately a quarter-inch less than 12 inches because of natural, and unpreventable, "vagaries in the baking process" provide the same bread as those that bake to the full 12 inches. Second, Subway standardizes the amount of meat and cheese that its "sandwich artists" put on each sandwich, so whether the bread is 12 inches long or a quarter-inch short, the customer still gets the same amount of food. (In the interest of full disclosure, because I am a regular, I do occasionally get an extra slice of ham, salami, and pepperoni on my six-inch BMT at my local Subway.) "This early discovery, limited though it was, extinguished any hope of certifying a damages class."

"Rather than drop the suits as meritless," however, plaintiffs shifted the focus of the lawsuit from one seeking damages to one seeking injunctive relief. THey filed an amendec complaint and, after mediation, reached a settlement with Subway, under which Subway would, for four years, implement practices designed to ensure, the the extent possible, that its sandwich rolls measured at least 12 inches long. But, the settlement noted that "because of the inherent variability in food production and the bread baking process, Subway could not guarantee that each sandwich roll [would] always be exactly 12 inches or greater in length after baking." In other words, Subway would try to fix, but could not guarantee that it would fix, the problem that spawned the lawsuit.

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On a warm summer’s evenin’, on a train bound for nowhere . . . is a dispute over insuring a stranger’s life

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

I know it is a little obvious, but I couldn't write a post about gambling without using lyrics from "The Gambler." Fortunately, the case this post discusses — Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. U.S. Bank National Association — is anything but obvious. Sun Life involved gambling on another person's life but not in a Deer Hunter, Russian roulette kind of way. In Sun Life, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the enforceability of an insurance policy that insured a stranger's life.

In Sun Life, Judge Posner began his decision by discussing the common law principle that "forbids a person to own an insurance policy that insures someone else's life unless the policy owner has an insurable interest in that life." A wife can have an insurable interest in her husband's or children's lives, a creditor can have an insurable interest in a debtor's life, but "you cannot own an insurance policy on the life of a stranger who you happen to know is in poor health and likely to die soon." The reason is that, by doing so, you are essentially gambling on another person's life, and gambling contracts are generally unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

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Back to Basics: Personal Guaranty Not Enforceable Without Consideration

by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)

Sometimes the most basic things can cause the biggest problems. One of the first lessons learned in the first year of law school is that a valid contract requires consideration – some benefit flowing to each side of the deal. In M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. Amiel, the Appellate Division reminded us how failing to satisfy this basic requirement can derail an otherwise seemingly straightforward matter.

In Spiegel, defendants were two individuals who formed an LLC that operated two gas stations. The LLC purchased fuel oil from plaintiff. By March 2012, however, the LLC allegedly owned plaintiff more than $1 million for fuel oil deliveries, therefore plaintiff stopped making deliveries. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff entered into an agreement with the LLC pursuant to which the LLC agreed to make regular monthly payments to plaintiff to resolve its debt. As part of the agreement, the LLC entered into a promissory note with defendants for the full amount of the debt. Defendants were never asked to, and never agreed to, provide a personal guaranty in connection with the promissory note. But, shortly after the promissory note was signed, plaintiff asked defendants to sign a personal guaranty, which they did.

The LLC eventually defaulted on the promissory note, and plaintiff sued defendants to recover on the personal guaranty. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The only fact issue that either side raised was whether there was adequate consideration for the personal guaranty. Plaintiff asserted that the personal guarantee was provided to induce plaintiff to continue to supply fuel oil to the LLC’s gas stations, therefore there was adequate consideration and the guaranty should be enforced. Defendants countered that, by the time the personal guaranty was presented to them, the LLC had already made arrangements to purchase fuel oil from a new supplier and therefore the personal guaranty was void for lack of consideration.

The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendants’ cross-motion, holding that the guaranty was “clear and direct,” and that the “‘forbearance of the plaintiff to forego collection of the full amount’ and to ‘span out a payment plan’” provided adequate consideration. Defendants appealed and the Appellate Division reversed.

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New Jersey Supreme Court Refuses To Hear Challenge To Waiver Rule

by: Peter J. Gallagher

The New Jersey Supreme Court has denied a request by a group of challengers to the so-called Waiver Rule (N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1, et seq.) — which allows the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (”DEP”) to waive certain environmental regulations on a case-by-case basis — to review an Appellate Division decision upholding the rule. On behalf of amicus New Jersey Business and Industry Association, Porzio helped to defend the Waiver Rule before the Appellate Division.

As we previously reported here, the Waiver Rule is not a blanket waiver of all regulations. Instead, a waiver will only be available when one of four criteria are met: (1) a public emergency has been formally declared; (2) conflicting rules between Federal and State agencies or between State agencies are adversely impacting a project or preventing an activity from proceeding; (3) a net environmental benefit would be achieved; and/or (4) undue hardship is being imposed by the rule requirements. N.J.A.C. 7:1B-2.1. Moreover, the Waiver Rule identifies 13 rules and requirements that cannot be waived under any circumstances.

A group of Appellants challenged the Waiver Rule on several grounds, but the Appellate Division rejected the challenge and held that the Waiver Rule was a proper exercise of the DEP's rule-making authority. The New Jersey Supreme Court has now refused to hear the case, which leaves intact the Appellate Division's decision.

Appellate Division Endorses “Waiver Rule:” DEP Allowed To Waive Regulations In Limited Circumstances

by: Peter J. Gallagher

On March 21, 2013, the Appellate Division rejected a challenge to the so-called Waiver Rule (N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1, et seq.), which allows the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (”DEP”) to waive certain environmental regulations on a case-by-case basis. On behalf of amicus New Jersey Business and Industry Association, Porzio had argued that the Waiver Rule represents a common sense and measured approach to regulation. In its decision, the Appellate Division appears to have agreed.

The history of the Waiver Rule is not long. On January 20, 2010, Governor Christie issued Executive Order No. 2, which sought to better leverage New Jersey’s “enormously valuable assets” by, among other things, “establishing ‘Common Sense Principles’ for State rules and regulations that will give this State the opportunity to energize and encourage a competitive economy to benefit businesses and ordinary citizens.” One of these “Common Sense Principles” required State agencies to “[a]dopt rules for ‘waivers’ which recognize that rules can be conflicting or unduly burdensome,” and further required these agencies to “adopt regulations that allow for waivers from the strict compliance with agency regulations,” provided that “such waivers shall not be inconsistent with the core missions of the agency.”

Although it did not identify Executive Order No. 2 as the source of its authority to do so, shortly after Governor Christie issued the Order, the DEP began developing rules and regulations designed to address the concerns regarding the impact of excessive regulation on New Jersey’s economy. The result was the Waiver Rule, which was only adopted after the DEP solicited public comments to the proposed Waiver Rule through an open public comment period, during which DEP received comments from more than 500 interested parties, and during a public hearing.

Notwithstanding its name, the Waiver Rule is not a blanket waiver of all regulations. Instead, a waiver will only be available when one of four criteria are met: (1) a public emergency has been formally declared; (2) conflicting rules between Federal and State agencies or between State agencies are adversely impacting a project or preventing an activity from proceeding; (3) a net environmental benefit would be achieved; and/or (4) undue hardship is being imposed by the rule requirements. N.J.A.C. 7:1B-2.1. Moreover, the Waiver Rule identifies 13 rules and requirements that cannot be waived under any circumstances.

A group of Appellants, led by the American Littoral Society Association of New Jersey challenged the Waiver Rule on several grounds. Today, the Appellate Division rejected that challenge. First, the court held that the Waiver Rule was a proper exercise of the DEP's rule-making authority. Specifically, the court held:

"[T]he power to promulgate a regulation implies the incidental authority to suspend or waive its application on certain limited, well-defined circumstances provided such exemption does not circumvent any legislative enactment or purpose, or federal law, is consistent with the agency's statutory core mission and objectives, is accomplished through a properly adopted regulation pursuant to the [Administrative Procedures Act], and establishes appropriate and clear standards for the exercise of agency discretion . . ."

Second, the court held that the Waiver Rule satisfied all of the caveats set forth above — it was limited in its application, was based on well-defined standards, and was not inconsistent with the DEP's core mission.

The court did agree with Appellants that certain "guidance documents" posted by the DEP on its website in connection with the Waiver Rule were improper. The court held that these documents went beyond “merely facilitating administrative implementation of the rules . . . and actually, to some extent, announce[d] new substantive requirements.” As a result, they amounted to the DEP effectively announcing new rules without following the procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, the “guidance” documents were struck down. But, the court was careful to explain that this did not in any way change its conclusion that the Waiver Rule was proper.