by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher) (LinkedIn)
One of my children's preschool teachers was fond of saying, "you get what you get and you don't get upset." (Not to my little angel, of course, but to other children.) In Curran v. Curran, the Appellate Division basically applied this admonition to the parties to an arbitration agreement, holding that they got what they intended out of the agreement, therefore they could not argue, after the fact, that an unenforceable provision in the agreement voided the entire agreement.
In Curran, plaintiff filed for divorce from defendant. With the advice of counsel, the parties entered into a consent order to refer all issues incident to their divorce to arbitration under the New Jersey Arbitration Act. In the consent order, the parties acknowledged that any arbitration award that was entered could only be set aside or modified by a court under the limited grounds set forth in the Arbitration Act — e.g., the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means, the court found evidence of "evident partiality" by the arbitrator, the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, etc. But the parties also included a handwritten provision, which provided: "The parties reserve their rights to appeal the arbitrator's award to the appellate division as if the matter was determined by the trial court." This is the provision that would cause all of the problems.
After the arbitrator entered a preliminary award, plaintiff requested reconsideration. The arbitrator then issued a comprehensive award setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed a motion in the Law Division for an order modifying the award, citing eight alleged "mistakes of law" made by the arbitrator. Plaintiff also argued that the intent of the handwritten provision was not to allow for direct appeal to the Appellate Division, but was instead was evidence that the parties intended a more searching review of the award that what would normally be allowed under the Arbitration Act. The trial court agreed, holding that the paragraph itself was unenforceable because it purported to "create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement." The trial court noted that "[t]he authority of a court to hear and determine certain classes of cases rests solely with the Constitution and the Legislature." But the trial court agreed with plaintiff that the handwritten provision demonstrated the parties' intent to provide for "a little more review" than what would normally be allowed under the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the trial court "in essence act[ed] as the Appellate Division of the arbitrator." It performed a comprehensive review of the arbitrator's decision and affirmed the award.
Continue reading “Unenforceable Clause In Arbitration Agreement Does Not Void Agreement”
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
While data breaches and cyber security are, unfortunately, regular topics on the nightly news, a New Jersey trial court recently dealt with a much more low-tech privacy issue. In Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, the trial court addressed the “intriguing question” (the court’s words, not necessarily mine) of “whether the winning bidders in a public auction have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal information transmitted to a public agency in connection with their participation in [a public] auction.” In other words, if you are the winning bidder at a public auction, must the public entity that held the auction produce documents revealing your identity in response to an OPRA request? In Brennan, the trial court’s answer was a qualified yes.
In Brennan, the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office seized baseball memorabilia from an individual who it alleged had illegally sold prescription drugs. The memorabilia was later sold at an auction administered by a third-party that the prosecutor’s office hired to handle the auction. Plaintiff filed an OPRA request seeking, among other things, documents that would reveal the identities of the winning bidders at the auction – registration forms and bid documents that revealed names and phone numbers of the winning bidders. The prosecutor’s office refused to provide this information, claiming that the winning bidders reasonably expected that their identities would not be made public. Plaintiff sued to compel the production of the documents.
Continue reading “Going Once . . . Going Twice . . . Sold! To The Person Who Cannot Remain Anonymous!”
by: Peter J. Gallagher (@pjsgallagher)
When asked about same-sex marriage, the musician/politician/author Kinky Friedman is quoted as having said: “I support gay marriage. I believe they have a right to be as miserable as the rest of us.” In a recent decision, Groh v. Groh, a New Jersey trial court ruled that, if same-sex partners are "as miserable as the rest of us" (present company excluded, natch), they can now get a divorce for the same reason as "the rest of us" — irreconcilable differences. Interestingly, while Groh dealt with the often divisive issue of same-sex marriage (or, more accurately, divorce), it was a lesson in the much less divisive practice of statutory interpretation.
In Groh, plaintiff and defendant entered into a civil union only to file competing claims to dissolve the civil union five years later on the no-fault grounds of irreconcilable differences. The parties entered into a written settlement agreement that resolved all of their differences, and “sought to conclude the proceedings via dual judgment of dissolution.” However, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2.1, which sets forth the grounds upon which the dissolution of a civil union can be based, does not include irreconcilable differences. Accordingly, the court had to decide whether it could grant the dissolution on those grounds.
Continue reading “Divorce Equality Comes To New Jersey”